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Fight the Hyp o

Chairman [Arthur N.] Abbey, Dean [Anthony W.]
Crowell, members of the board, colleagues, alumni,
students, friends, and a special tip of the hat to my
dear wife Jo for making the trip:
I’m thrilled to be here this morning and my heartfelt
thanks to Anthony Crowell for the honor of the
appointment and making it all possible.
In casting about for a topic, I considered drawing something of interest from the courses I
conven
t ionally teach; for example, “paradoxes of
19th Century interstate taxation cases under the
Commerce Clause, with special reference to pru
dential standing” — all in favor of that one, raise your
hands — or “gerunds, nominalizations, and dangling
par
t i
ciples: the crisis in American compositional
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practice.” But it dawned on me that you probably
listen to lectures like these from your CLE providers
all the time.
It’s likely to be more fun, and possibly even
more enlightening, to think out loud about some
thing closer to all of us — I mean, what we do in
the law school classroom. I want to reflect for a few
minutes — I hope you won’t think it an eternity —
on the core of the law school experience, and
suggest that some of what we’ve been doing might
not make sense. I know that this claim comes as a
surprise.
Because this is a lecture, not a treatise or an article, I have a certain luxury: I do not intend to settle
issues but to provoke.
I mean to talk about the core of the law school
experience. What is law school all about? Let me put
it in three words.
The first word is “Suppose.” It’s how we often
begin. Suppose this, suppose that, and suppose the
other thing. You’ve been there. Me too. I can still
remember, and with chills, my criminal law professor, just months shy now of 50 years ago, calling out
his Suppose. He supposed a lot about Martians, newly
landed on the planet, wholly ignorant of earth and
human culture, but, he assured us, fully conversant
in English.
The second and third words are “it depends.”
That phrase is what students, if they’re quick, soon
learn to respond to resist their Socratic interlocutor,
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who threatens to drag them down an un
wel
come
path leading to complete intellectual and emotional
confusion.
At the heart of the “suppose” and the “it
depends” is the hypothetical (or what I will mostly
refer to as the “hypo”): The situation with questions
attached that we toss into the classroom like a bomb
with a short fuse. The burden of my remarks this
morning is to suggest that we don’t always know, we
aren’t always consistent about, and we rarely make it
clear what we’ve learned when we force an answer to
the hypos we pose.
To make these airy abstractions concrete, let’s
inspect a class of hypos with a distinct advantage:
they concern a problem that we all have intuitions
about — runaway trolley cars. Trolley cases have been
so widely studied over the years that they now constitute an academic sub-discipline called Trolleyology.
I’m not kidding you. In fact, just in the past few
months two popular books on runaway trolleys have
been published to considerable notice.1 Really!
I’m going to pose two trolley hypos and ask you
by a show of hands how you respond. (This is a law
school: you didn’t think you’d get away scot free, did
you?) Each of the trolley hypos has a name and this
first one is called Spur (or sometimes Switch).
1 T homas Cathcart, The Trolley Problem or Would You Throw the Fat

Guy off the Bridge? (New York: Workman, 2013); David Edmonds,
Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer
Tells Us about Right and Wrong (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2014).
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Suppose a trolley is speeding along the tracks.
The conductor decides to slow it down but the
brakes fail. The trolley is a runaway. You are standing nearby watching and see, to your horror, that
five people are tied to the tracks just ahead. If no
one does anything the trolley will run them over
and they will die. Luckily, you spot a switch that will
allow you to divert the trolley to a spur or side track.
Unfortunately, some
one is tied up on that track
also. Luckily, though, it’s only one person. What do
you do?
Let’s see a show of hands. How many of you
would pull the switch and send the trolley along the
spur, leading to the death of only the one person
rather than the five? 2 Hands in the air. Don’t be
shy. We won’t take your names. You won’t be graded.
All right, hands down. Now, how many of you
would refuse to pull the switch, preferr ing to let the
trolley run its course, leading to five deaths rather
than one?
You voted roughly four to one, consistent with
other respondents. Experiments with different audiences during recent years show that about 80% of
those asked about Spur vote to sidetrack the trolley
and let one die rather than five. Most of us, it seems,
are card-carrying utilitarians. The greatest good for
the greatest number.
2 It probably would not have changed your mind had I said “causing

the one man to die rather than the five.” Do you suppose it would
change the minds of others inclined to pull the switch?
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Now a second trolley hypothetical, this one
called Footbridge. You are on a footbridge directly
over the trolley tracks. Looking back you see the
runaway trolley rushing along. Looking ahead, you
see the five people tied to the track. Desperate to
find some way to avert this impending disaster, you
spot a fat man standing near you on the footbridge,
looking down from the edge. You realize that if you
push him over he will fall onto the track, just ahead
of the trolley. He is heavy enough that he will stop
the train and save the five men. Of course, he will
die in the attempt.
Hands again: all those who would push the fat
man onto the tracks?
Hands down, and again, those who would not
push the fat man onto the tracks, sparing him but
letting the five men die?
This time the vote is quite different: about 45 to
1 against. You are much more severe than the general population. Experimenters have found that only
about a third of test subjects will vote to push,3
whereas, as I have said, upwards of 80% or more will
send the trolley down the spur.
How can we account for this discrepancy? Those
who would pull the switch in Spur usually say that by
the time they realize what’s about to happen, it’s a
done deal. Someone is going to die. You have it in
your power to save more at the expense of fewer. You
3 Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between

Us and Them (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), p. 215.
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didn’t set these events in motion; you just chanced to
be there at that moment close to the switch. In Footbridge, by contrast, you confront an innocent man,
unrelated to the
 unfolding disaster. If he dies, it’s
because you personally killed him. It’s obvious
ly
immoral to kill an innocent man, even if to save others. Does that sound correct? Is that how you would
explain the difference? If so, you are not a utilitarian
but — I’m going to use the technical term here — a
deontologist. That just means, for those of you have
forgotten Philosophy 101, that you believe people
have certain rights not to be used, no matter the
consequences.
Or perhaps you don’t see a discrepancy between
Spur and Footbridge. For it turns out, on closer
inspection, that the explanation of the difference
that I just gave really won’t wash. In both cases,
someone is going to die; the alternatives in each are
five or one. The one man tied to the tracks is as
innocent as the fat man. In each case, the choice is
yours. If that’s so, and many people believe it is,
then we face a big problem. How can we differen
tiate our choices, given our feelings that it’s right to
spare the one in Spur and improper to kill the fat
man in Footbridge?
That’s what trolleyology is all about. It’s the
attempt, by some very smart people, to try to sort out
our instincts about morality through a series of
hypotheticals about runaway trolley cars. The trolley
problem was devised in 1967 in an article about
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abortion.4 The author was Philippa Foot, a wellknown Oxford philosopher who happened to be the
granddaughter of President Grover Cleveland. She
used Spur as a minor example to sort through the
perplexities of the abortion question — mind you,
this was years before Roe v. Wade. Trolley problems
were made more rigorous and brought into the
mainstream philosophical conversation in articles by
MIT philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson beginning
in 19765 and in a 1990 book on rights.6 Since then
the com
men
t ary has exploded, and just this past
year, as I said, trolleyology has found its way into the
popular conversation in two books. The literature
has spawned quite a number of variations, including
Loop, Two Loop, Lazy Susan, Six Behind One,
Tractor, Obstacle Collide, Extra Push, Tumble,

Remote Footbridge, Footbridge Switch, Trap Door,
and many others, including some situated not on
trolley tracks but in hospital rooms; for example,
Transplant. For lack of time, I won’t detain you with
any of these variations.
4
“The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double

Effect,” Oxford Review, vol. 5:5–15 (1967), reprinted in Philippa
Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1981), pp. 19–32.
5
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley
Problem,” The Monist, vol. 54:204-217 (1976) and “The Trolley
Problem,” 94 Yale L.J. 1395-415 (1985); see also Thomson, “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 36(4):259-274
(2008), in which she seems to have recanted her earlier position
in Spur.
6 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990).
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But how do we explain the difference most of us
feel in sparing the five in Spur and sparing the one
in Footbridge? One mainstream philosophical explanation is known as the Doctrine of Double Effect, a
principle that traces at least as far back as St. Thomas
Aquinas. In essence, it says that it’s morally permissible to take an action that might prove harmful if it’s
merely a side effect of a laudable action. As long as you
don’t intend the harmful result, even if you know it’s
likely to happen, you are still acting morally. For
example, you intend to save the five men, and you
can do so by throwing the switch to divert the trolley
down the side track. It’s regrettable that someone
else is tied up, but your intention is not to kill him.
You’d be delighted if he managed to untie himself
and scramble out of the way. In Footbridge, however,
you do intend to kill the fat man. True, you’re doing
so to spare the five, but you are using the fat man
directly as a means to your end, not as a side effect.
You would not be happy if the fat man, having fallen
on the track, managed to rally, stand up, and step off
the tracks just in time.
Many people accept this double effect doctrine
as the explanation. You might also. But some of you
may see a pretty thin line between tossing the fat
man down and supposing that the single man, tied
tightly to the tracks, might get away. You might blush
to argue that the differ
ence between a murder
indictment and a humanitarian award is how plaus
ibly you can make your inten
t ions innocent when

8

j e t h ro k . l i e be r m a n

you say of Spur, “well, I didn’t mean to kill that poor
fellow; I thought there was a chance he’d escape; I
wasn’t absolutely sure he’d be run over.”
Lately, a new explanation for the discrepancy
has surfaced, and from a surprising quarter. This
new account has emerged from experi
mental
p sychology and neurology, not from analytic arguments of philosophers. The psychologists and
neurologists have come up with a startling finding.
They say that your intuition has nothing to do with
philosophy or reason: it has to do with brain
structure.
In briefest compass, the explanation is this: We
have certain neural circuitry in our brains, circuitry put there for reasons of evolutionary
pressure when humans were coming down from
the treetops in the jungle. Joshua Greene, director
of the Moral Cognition Lab at Harvard, and one of
the leading pioneers of these studies, summarizes
the point in his current book, Moral Tribes, through
the metaphor of the camera. These days, most
cameras have two modes of operation: manual
mode, in which the photographer chooses what
speed and aperture opening to use; and a utomatic
mode, in which you just point and click, leaving it
to the internal mechanism to figure out the parameters instantaneously. Manual mode takes longer
but gives the photographer much more control and
precision. Automatic mode is reliable for many
sorts of pictures, but not all.
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Just so, says Greene, our brains have evolved a
manual-mode response and an automatic-mode
response to harm-filled situations. When we contem
plate Spur, we go into manual mode (because we are
not directly using personal force against anyone as a
means to an end); this mode permits a utilitarian
judgment to emerge. The automatic response takes
over when we are presented with Footbridge. We
have a “gut feeling,” a snap emotional judgment,
that it’s wrong to directly use a person as a means to
an end, especially if it involves using our own personal force to seriously harm or kill him. As Greene
puts it, our brain is wired to be “emotionally but not
cognitively blind to side effects.”7 In other words,
alarm bells go off automatically if we perceive ourselves (or someone else) immediately caus
ing
personal and direct harm to another person as a
means to an end. But the bells remain silent if the
harm is a side effect of what we’re trying to do. Of
course we understand the side effects—it’s just that
alarm bells don’t go off automatically. We have to
pause and think about it. That’s why we immediately
sup
pose some
t hing’s wrong with pushing the fat
man over the bridge, but then, when we stop to consider it, have difficulty understanding the difference
between killing one on the tracks to save five, and
pushing one over to save five.
This is a fascinating explanation, and it’s not
mere speculation. Experimental results back it up.
7 Greene, supra note 3, p. 224.
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For one thing, people with defects in or injuries to
particularized brain regions are much more likely
to say they would toss the fat man off the bridge,
suggesting that there really is an automatic-mode
gizmo in our circuits that in some people is
impaired. People also are more likely to approve of
death to the fat man if the facts of Footbridge are
varied a bit. For example, when respondents are
told the fat man is standing on top of a trap door,
and by pushing a button they can open the door to
drop him straight down to the tracks, many more
people are likely to say that they would push the
button than that they would push the man over the
edge them
selves. So your different responses to
Spur and Footbridge can be explained as a combination or interaction of two factors. As Greene
sums it up:
If you harm someone using personal force, but
as a side effect, that doesn’t seem so bad. . . .
And if you harm someone as a means, but without the use of personal force, that doesn’t seem
so bad. . . . But if you harm someone as a
means and you use personal force, then the
action seems wrong to most people. . . . Thus,
it seems that harm as a means of using personal force is a magic combination.8

I’m willing to accept these conclusions. Who am
I to challenge scientific findings? But I’m not persuaded that they explain the discrepancy between
8 Id., p. 222.
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our instincts about the different moral resolution of
Spur and Footbridge. I think the difficulty may lie
in the hypos. Let me treat you to one more trolley
example, this one, I think, of my own devising.9 I
call it Evil Man.
Let me set the stage. Our professor has just
presented Footbridge to a student sitting in the
third row. The student has concluded, as most of
us do, that it would be wrong to kill the fat man.
Why? asks the Professor. Explain yourself. “Well,”
says the student hopefully, “because he’s innocent.” Of what? “I mean,” the student continues,
confidence building, “he has nothing to do with
the trolley.”
“Suppose,” says the Professor, “that he’s Hermann
Göring.”
Silence from the student. This is a modern-day
classroom.
The Professor eventually says: “You don’t know
the name Hermann Göring?” The student blushes,
remains silent.
“Hermann Göring was Hitler’s second in command, chief of the Luftwaffe, a plunderer of European
art and treasure, ruthless scum. Also, he was quite
obese.”
“Oh,” says the student, now enlightened.
9
T homson considers at some length in her essays who the

potential victims might be and the difference that that might
make. Unlike Evil Man, her examples mostly center on the victims’ relationship to the tracks and how they came to be in
harm’s way.
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“Suppose, then,” the Professor continues, “that
Hermann Göring, a well-known fat man, is standing
on the bridge, in a contemplative mood, watching
the trolley move east.”
“Does he have anything to do with this trolley?”
“No.”
“What about the five men?” our student asks,
getting the hang of it.
“What about them?”
“Who are they?”
“They happen to be five scientists who are on
the verge of discovering a cure for cancer. If
they somehow wriggle out of the ropes and get
back to their lab this very afternoon, cancer is
defeated.”
“Oh, well in that case,” says our eager student,
“by all means, push him over.”
“Whatever happened to ‘but it would be
wrong?’” the Professor says triumphantly, and our
poor student once again is struck dumb and
doesn’t understand what just happened or how he
got there.
Evil Man seems to contradict Greene’s hypothesis. The difference between Spur and this new
version of Footbridge is not the difference
between means and side effects or personal force
vs. indirect force or action. It is about the character of the potential victims, since as our student
concluded and as many of you may agree, it’s per
missible to use personal force as a means to kill
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one person to save others, as long as the one to be
killed is really evil and the five to be saved are
really good.10
Perhaps you are thinking I’m playing a trick. It
can’t both be right and wrong to push the fat man
over. I propose that there is a trick, and that the
trick lies buried in the nature of the hypo. The trolley hypothetical, like many others, is what I have
called a FAKE hypothesis or argument.11 F - A - K - E
stands for Facts Are Known Exactly. In this class of
hypotheticals, you construct an argument resting
on a foundation of facts all of which are positively
10 Perhaps the evolutionary psychologist can easily enough explain

the student’s reaction to that too: it would make sense, after all,
for evolution to have selected a neural gizmo that makes it more
likely to make a snap judgment to refrain from killing a friend
or even a stranger than a known enemy. A very recent study,
published three days before I delivered this lecture, reported
on an experiment suggesting that another variable may also
affect moral judgment in Footbridge. The study found that
people will more likely sacrifice the fat man if they are asked
in a foreign language, rather than their native tongue, how to
respond to the Footbridge problem. The experimenters concluded that people are more likely to offer utilitarian solutions
to moral problems (though not by a huge percentage) when they
are separated from the emotional overtones of their own language. Albert Costa, Alice Foucart, Sayuri Hayakawa, Melina
Aparici, et al., “Your Morals Depend on Language,” PloS ONE
9(4):e9842. doi:10.1371/journal.pone009842 (April 23, 2014).
Accessed on May 15, 2014, at http://www.plosone.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0094842. This result
appears to be consistent with Greene’s conclusion that “utilitarian judgments depend more on cognitive control.” Greene,
supra note 3, p. 127.
11 A term I coined in my recent book, Liberalism Undressed (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 90.
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known. You instruct your students or your readers
that the conditions to be considered are precisely
and only the ones specified and that they may be
wholly relied on as true when formulating an
answer.
A simple yet powerful FAKE argument, one that
has echoed down the pages of human history,
begins with this claim: “God told me to . . .” The
argument goes like this: When God tells you to do
something, it is moral to do it. So if God tells you to
kill your first-born, you not only may but should do
so. Of course, you recognize right away that as lawyers we could never permit such an excuse. The law
allows no defense to a homicide charge that would
permit you to plead that God gave you the order.
And for a simple reason: we know of no way to
establish the reality of your defense. Only in Hypoland do we know it to be true.12
That was, I now realize, the problem with my criminal law professor’s class of hypotheticals involving the
12 I mean, of course, a defense that would permit a verdict of not

guilty that would free the defendant. To establish a defense of
insanity, however, the law might permit you to prove what is
known as a “deific decree delusion.” In construing its insanity
statute, the Colorado Supreme Court said that even a defendant
who knows killing is unlawful, may “be judged legally insane
where, as here, the defendant’s cognitive ability to distinguish
right from wrong with respect to the act has been destroyed as
a result of a psychotic delusion that God has decreed the act.”
People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo. 1992). The defendant
need not prove the truth of the claim, merely that because of
a mental disease or defect he believed it. Thanks to Robert
Blecker for the reference.
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ignorant English-speaking Martians. He often would
press them into service to show that drunk drivers
couldn’t help themselves — or something like that. But
what was specified in the hypo cannot apply on planet
earth. In fact, it is an even worse FAKE argument than
the God hypothesis. We can at least imagine what’s
assumed when a defendant asserts that God told him
how to act. It’s possible, I suppose, that some day God
will make his presence known to the satisfaction of
everyone and tell us just who it is he’s talking to. But it’s
not pos
si
ble to imagine that someone can speak
English (or any language) and be wholly ignorant of
the meanings, connotations, and implications of words
and their cultural under
pin
nings. The facts of the
Martian hypo were totally disconnected from its power
to teach us anything about how the law is or ought to
be. But, I suspect, my professor would not have let us
say so. Had we pointed out the fatuousness of the hypo,
he likely would have retorted, “well, just accept it as
fact and answer the question.” That, I think, is an
impossible request. And had a student answered it, the
assumptions under which the student was laboring
would likely never have surfaced. The answer would be
worthless and the professor would not have tested what
the student knew or was actually thinking about.
The way around the discrepancy between Spur
and Footbridge, then, is to understand that the
question that follows the Suppose is ambiguous.
Perhaps you are being asked whether on these precise facts it’s permissible to do what you’re asked to
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do. The smart listener says, well, It Depends. What if
the fat man is Hermann Göring? What if I’m not
strong enough to push the fat man over? What if he
resists me? What if he isn’t really positioned to land
at the precise point on the track? What if my timing
is off and he falls on top of the trolley, not in front
of it? What if he isn’t heavy enough to stop it? What
if in our tussle I topple over with him? It’s these
sorts of wholly rational thoughts about the real
world that are not permitted to be raised as objections when confronted by a FAKE hypo. We live,
however, not in a FAKE world but in a REAL one,
where R - E - A - L stands for “Really, Exactitude
Ain’t Likely.”
Joshua Greene of Harvard seems to recognize
the point, without considering whether it calls into
question the validity of his test subjects’ answers.
He says:
Now you may be wondering — people often do
— whether I’m really saying that it’s right to
push the man off the footbridge. Here’s what
I’m saying: If you don’t feel that it’s wrong to
push the man off the footbridge, there’s something wrong with you. I, too, feel that it’s
wrong, and I doubt that I could actually bring
myself to push, and I’m glad that I’m like this.
What’s more, in the real world, not pushing
would almost certainly be the right decision.
But if someone with the best of intentions were
to muster the will to push the man off the footbridge, knowing for sure that it would save five
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lives, and knowing for sure that there was no
better alternative, I would approve of this
action, although I might be suspicious of the
person who chose to perform it.13

But there is a “for sure” only in the realm of the
FAKE, not in the world of the REAL.
I don’t mean to exhaust you but I do mean to push
on a little further. Perhaps all of this confusion and
apparent contradiction arises because the hypos concern morality, a notoriously open-ended, proof-elusive
field of inquiry. Perhaps the problem of the FAKE hypo
does not infect the world of pure logic. Alas, I’m
afraid that it does, and I offer you just one story, the
so-called Linda hypothetical, made famous by Daniel
Kahneman, the Nobel Prize-winning cognitive psychologist, and his collaborator, Amos Tversky. Here it is.
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues
of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrat ions.14

Now I’m going to ask you to say which of the following two statements is more probable:
A: Linda is a bank teller.
13 G reene, supra note 3, p. 251 (emphasis supplied). Greene says

that his experiments have “controlled for people’s real-world
expectations,” (p. 214), but I’m unclear whether those tests
show that respondents might answer as they do because they
reject the hypo’s premises.
14 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 156.
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B: Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist
movement.
Which is more probable, A or B? Raise your
hands if you think that it’s more probable that Linda
is only a bank teller than that she is both a bank teller
and active in the feminist movement. Okay, now a
show of hands if you think it’s the other way around:
more probable that Linda is both a bank teller and
active in the feminist movement than that she’s
“ just” a bank teller. It looks like we’re voting two to
one for B.
The answer? According to the logicians, A is always
more probable than B. It’s more likely that Linda is just
a bank teller than that she is both a bank teller and a
feminist activist. Can we be sure the logicians are correct? Cass Sunstein, the prolific law professor now at
Harvard, as recently as two days ago in The New York
Review of Books, in a review of one of the current trolleyology books, says we can.15 If you said B rather than A
you’ve committed the so-called “conjunction error.” It
is, says Sunstein, “an obvious mistake: a single outcome
has to be more likely than one that includes both that
outcome and another.” An event A, the logicians proclaim, is always more probable than two events, A and
B. But I suspect we’re in the grip of a FAKE argument,
which works only in the mathematical realm in which
facts can be supplied precisely.
15 
C ass Sunstein, “How Do We Know What’s Moral?” New York

Review of Books, April 24, 2014, p. 16 (reviewing Edmonds, supra
note 1).
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Suppose we’re picking marbles out of a hat.
Specify that there are an equal number of wellmixed identical black and white marbles. Let’s say
that event A is the selection of a black marble from
the hat. And let’s say that event B is the selection of
a black marble, followed by the selection of a white
marble. In that case, the logicians are correct. The
probability of drawing a single black marble is 50%.
The probability of drawing a single black marble
followed by a single white marble is 25%. Any
g ambler understands these odds.
But Linda isn’t like a bag of well-mixed marbles. Linda is a human being with a backg round.
Let’s say that Linda, given her backg round, would
be willing to be a bank teller (to have a steady
income, and guaranteed free evenings) only if she
could also be active in the feminist movement (calling to mind Oscar Wilde’s celebrated quip that
“The problem with socialism is that it takes up too
many evenings”). If Linda can’t be active in the
move
ment she doesn’t want to be a bank teller.
She’d do something else. If you asked me which is
more probable for me, being a professor or being a
professor and a writer, the answer is the latter,
because if I couldn’t be a writer while being a professor then I wouldn’t take the job of professor.16
16 T he answer may also depend on how the question is framed. I’d

answer B if the choice was (A) being a professor or (B) being a
professor and a writer, but A if the choice was (A) being a writer
or (B) being a writer and a professor.
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That explains a lot about the jobs I have had — and
the jobs that I’ve never considered.
What I’m suggesting is that people can (and
often do) think about verbal puzzles by importing
their own variations, intuiting or assuming hidden
variables. In the listeners’ minds, the facts of
non-mathematical puzzles are not known exactly. We
do read into these little hypotheticals our (perhaps
automatic but nevertheless informed) beliefs about
human characteristics. To say that Linda would more
likely be a bank teller than a bank teller and a feminist activist will trouble many of us, who understand
that people don’t just change their deepest convictions. It’s unreasonable to expect us to refrain from
extrap
ol
at
ing Linda’s likely path from what little
we’re told about Linda. She is likely to continue her
passion for social justice. Why would Linda desert
her passion in order to become a bank teller?17
17 Of course, we could be told more about Linda. Perhaps her parents

fell ill and she was required to take a job that would give spare time
to care for them. Then we’d understand why she’d be a bank teller
and not also an activist. Or perhaps we’d view the matter differently
if Linda had become the bank manager. She wouldn’t have time to
be an activist. Or she might consider that being identified with a
particular political cause would not be good for the bank, and she
is conscientious (she takes her fiduciary duties seriously as a manager); hence she forgoes her personal inclination. All of these are
things we’d think about, and reach nearly instantaneous judgments
about, when the puzzle is posed. That we answer the hypo with an
instinct about human psychology does not mean we are being illogical. It means that the interlocutor (the researcher who has devised
the hypothetical) hasn’t thought it through — or hasn’t thought
through what his test subjects are thinking. That’s why the answer
to the professor’s Suppose ought always to be It depends.
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Still not convinced? Let’s try this one:
As a child Linda regularly went to baseball
games with her father, who managed the
major league team in town. She always had
dinner from the concession stand at the ballpark. She still loves the stadium food, which
she always consumed with condiments. Which
is more probable?
A: At the ball game last night, Linda ate a hot
dog.
B: At the ball game last night, Linda ate a hot
dog and also ate mustard.

See what I mean? I’d vote for B. Wouldn’t you?
The conjunction error be damned. To insist on it as
an absolute is to forgo the possibility that the human
subject knows things that the experimenter hasn’t
considered. Formal propositions are never absolutes
in the real world. In the realm of these mathematical
hypotheticals, events are independent. But they
never are in the human world of motivations, interests, passions, and desire. The student or subject who
answers the Linda question is not necessarily wrong
in assessing those characteristics to decide how she
might actually behave.18
18 In delivering the lecture, I did not mention that as a child Linda

always ate her stadium food with condiments. Relatively few in
the audience raised their hands when asked whether they would
choose B. Several people told me afterward that they would
have chosen B had I specified Linda’s taste for condiments as
an element of her story. Whether their reaction is typical of
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Well, you may say, impatient for me to conclude, all that’s very interesting — I certainly hope
you find it interesting — but what does any of it
have to do with law and the legal system? We lawyers are surely more sophisticated than that. We
don’t — other than my criminal law professor —
deal in FAKE arguments. Alas, in fact, we do.
Since my time is short, three brief illustrations
must suffice.
A prototypical example is the problem of
cross-examination of the truthful witness. This
problem has been most thoroughly and fruitfully
explored by Professor Monroe H. Freedman of Hofstra Law School, whose first published law review
article, nearly half a century ago, on the general
problem of the lawyer’s responsibility for maintaining truth in the courtroom so infuriated then Judge
Warren Burger that he and two other judges sought
to have Freedman disbarred just for writing the
article.19 Freedman sought to show, among other
things, that if the client was likely to, or actually
did, commit perjury the code of professional
responsibility puts the lawyer in an impossible
people generally is hard to say, since this group of lawyers and
law professors was on high alert from the nuances of the hypos
to which they had been exposed in the immediately preceding
minutes. Their reaction does suggest that people are sensitive to
the nuances of the question and will not all draw the same inferences from the compact hypotheticals they are given.
19 
Freedman tells the story in Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers’
E thics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

1975), Preface.
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situation. Freedman advocated allowing the lawyer
to cooperate with the client in presenting false testimony.20 He rested his analysis in part on the code’s
attitude toward cross-examination. Freedman asked
us to imagine an elderly woman with impaired eyesight and a nervous disposition who testifies
truthfully that she saw your client at a certain location near the scene of a crime that he has been
wrongly accused of having committed. Her testimony will almost surely result in your client’s
conviction. But you are confident that you can shake
her testimony by vigorously cross-examining her. May
you ethically make mincemeat of her? Freedman’s
answer (as indeed, the code of professional responsibility’s answer) is that you may. His point was
that destroying the truthful witness has the same
effect as facilitating the lying witness. As you will
have guessed by now, I don’t doubt the answer, I
doubt the premise of the hypot hetical. If it’s known
to a certainty that she is telling the truth, it cannot be moral to tear her apart. Indeed, if we knew
to a certainty that she was telling the truth, what
would be the point of even putting her on the
stand? The judge should just instruct the jury that
the defendant was indeed at the particular corner
at the particular time and the witness did indeed
see him. It is only because we cannot assume omniscience, because we do not have absolute knowledge,
20 Freedman’s account is fine-grained and sophisticated; he did

not suppose that just anything goes.
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that we can justify testing claims through crossexamination.21
A like infirmity attends some hypotheticals
designed to probe the question of legalizing assisted
suicide. In a 1997 Supreme Court case, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 22 the plaintiffs argued that terminally ill
mentally competent adults have a right to commit
“physician-assisted” suicide. The claim was essentially that the Constitution recognizes a fundamental
liberty interest in “self-sovereignty”; as long as someone consents to die, the state may not prohibit others
from assisting him to achieve his end. The Court, I
think sensibly, rejected that view. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to the absence of any long
stand
ing
historical tradition of assisted suicide. But a more
direct reason is at hand. To have overturned a ban
on assisted suicide would have freed the assistant,
without any statutory safeguards in place, to assert a
claim that the decedent had consented to be helped
to his own demise — a claim more easily asserted
than disproved and that we understand can be
trusted only in Hypoland.23
21 S ee Monroe H. Freedman and Abbe Smith, Understanding Law-

yer’s Ethics (Newark: Lexis-Nexis, 3rd ed., 2004), pp. 163-164,
225-226.
22 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
23 For a curious, real-world case (not involving terminal illness),
see John Eligon, “Assisting Suicide to Be Focus of Trial in Motivational Speaker’s Death,” The New York Times, February 10,
2011, p. A20. The victim’s killer offered as a defense that the
victim, Jeffrey Locker, drove up to him on the street and asked
to be killed so that his family would receive insurance money.
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Finally, a fictional example from a classic movie
— but no less real for that, since it suggests the American weariness with the legal procedures we employ to
avoid the problems of the hypos we’ve been examin
ing. The Talk of the Town24 is about a detached law
professor (imagine that!), played by Ronald Colman.
His character is an unemotional idealist whose only
passion is for the intricacies of the law. He has always
dealt with the tumult of life at one remove. He is renting a house in the country while waiting to be
nominated to the Supreme Court. Meantime, the
town loner, played by Cary Grant, is falsely accused of
arson and winds up hiding out in Colman’s house.
Through madcap twists and turns, Colman tells the
landlady, who is convinced of Grant’s innocence, that
he cannot involve himself in the problems of people.
But in the end Colman kidnaps the real culprit, hauls
him back to the courtroom, where he fires his gun
into the ceiling to stay the townspeople from lynching
Grant. Colman “quiets the mob by telling them that
the law is their most precious possession and that they
must always respect its processes.”25 As a result of his
heroics, our professor is nominated and confirmed to
the Supreme Court. In an analysis of the image of the
lawyer in popular culture, Robert C. Post says of The
Talk of the Town:
24 The Talk of the Town (Columbia Pictures, 1942); directed by

George Stevens; screenplay by Irwin Shaw and Sidney Buchman.
25 Robert C. Post, “On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflec-

tions in a Dark Glass,” 75 California L. Rev. 379, 381 (1987).
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It is a wonderful moment. The man who has
just forcibly kidnapped the criminal is lecturing the crowd on the virtue of the law. The
paradox is not accidental, for the very thrust
of the film is that Colman’s willingness to
break the law qualifies him for the Supreme
Court. Sometimes, in other words, the lawyer
must be lawless in order to uphold the law.
Put that way, of course, we can begin to recognize a classic American theme. 26

I think that that wonderful moment has a different meaning. The audience recognizes that
Colman the lawyer did right because the audience,
transported to Hypoland, has been assured of the
facts. The world’s opaqueness has evaporated
because we have been told by the omniscient writer
who the real culprit is, and so we can cheer the
professor’s character-altering bravado. But outside
the theater, we know no such thing. Our neighbors’ frustration with the rule-abiding lawyer and
his fidelity to a mind-numbing pro
cess is very
often a reflection of rage and bafflement at the
world’s uncertainties. But we know better and we
need to teach better. Asking whether we may kidnap the culprit whom we know to be guilty is to
ask whether we may avoid the law to fulfill the law.
Only in movies.
Some years ago, a business law textbook gave a
bit of practical advice to students: In trying to
26 Id., p. 382.

27

f igh t t h e h y p o

under
stand the law, don’t quarrel with the hypo,
just answer the question.27 I’m a bit rueful about
that advice, since I was the one who wrote it. As you
can tell, I’ve been re
considering. So I end, as I
began, with three words: Fight the hypo.

27 
Jethro K. Lieberman and George J. Siedel, Business Law and

the Legal Environment of Business (Ft. Worth: The Dryden Press,
1992), p. x.
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